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In a highly inﬂuential contribution, Lucas (1987) argues that the welfare costs of business
cycles are likely to be very small, and that therefore the potential beneﬁts from counter-
cyclical stabilization policy are negligible. His argument is based on a calibrated representative-
agent model with no production, that is, Lucas (1987) assumes that there is no uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk and that economic growth and business cycles are unrelated. This pa-
per asks to what extend the introduction of market incompleteness and production changes
Lucas’ conclusions regarding the welfare cost of business cycles.
The current analysis is based on an incomplete-markets version of the class of endoge-
nous growth models analyzed by, among others, Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo
(1991).1 More speciﬁcally, households are ex ante identical and have CRRA-preferences,
production displays constant returns to scale with respect to physical and human capital,
and all markets are competitive. There are aggregate productivity shocks that aﬀect the
return to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and wages), and there are
idiosyncratic human capital shocks that only aﬀect human capital returns.2 Conditional on
the history of aggregate states, these idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed over
time and identically distributed across households. Finally, the ﬁnancial market structure is
incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoﬀs that depend on idiosyncratic
shocks. However, households have the opportunity to trade stocks (accumulate physical
1See also Alvarez and Stokey (1998) and Caballe and Santos (1993). Lucas (1988) analyzes a human
capital model with externalities. Krebs (2002) shows that the current incomplete-markets model admits for
simple recursive equilibria and provides a useful characterization of equilibrium, and Krebs (2001) studies a
version of the model with log-utility and no aggregate risk.
2A negative human capital shock (depreciation shocks) might occur when ﬁrm- or sector-speciﬁc skills
are either destroyed or made obsolete in the event of a job loss. Jovanovic (1979) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998) analyze search models with speciﬁc human capital, but they assume risk-neutral workers
and do not model the accumulation of physical capital. Empirically, the permanent wage loss of displaced
workers is substantial (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, Neal 1995, and Topel 1991) suggesting that
job displacement is associated with large losses of ﬁrm or sector-speciﬁc human capital.
1capital) and any asset (bond) in zero net supply with payoﬀs that depend on the aggregate
shock variable.
The incomplete-markets model analyzed in this paper is highly tractable in the sense that
there is always one equilibrium allocation that is identical to the equilibrium allocation of an
economy in which households consume and produce in autarky facing both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk. In other words, a recursive equilibrium of the incomplete-markets economy
can be found by solving a one-agent decision problem, but this one-agent decision problem
is not the one-agent decision problem associated with the complete-markets economy (idio-
syncratic risk matters). Exploiting the tractability of the model, this paper ﬁrst conducts a
qualitative analysis of the growth and welfare eﬀects of business cycles. The analysis assumes
that the amount of idiosyncratic risk varies over the business cycle, and that the elimination
of business cycles removes these variations in idiosyncratic risk leaving the average amount
of idiosyncratic risk unchanged. The economic motivation for this assumption derives from
recent empirical work (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2001a, and Meghir and Pistaferri,
2001) that has documented strong cyclical variations in uninsured idiosyncratic labor in-
come risk, and the notion that counter-cyclical stabilization policy might eliminate these
variations in idiosyncratic risk without changing the average amount of idiosyncratic risk
(Atkeson and Phelan, 1994, Imrohoroglu, 1989, Krusell and Smith, 1999, and Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron, 2001b).
The qualitative analysis shows that business cycles have the following general eﬀects on
growth and welfare. First, a reduction in the variation in idiosyncratic human capital risk
makes human capital investment less risky, and therefore induces households to invest more
in high-return human capital. Thus, economic growth always increases if total investment in
physical and human capital does not decrease, which is the case if the degree of relative risk
aversion is less than or equal to one. However, if the degree of risk aversion is larger than
2one, then economic growth may decrease due to the reduction in total investment. Second,
although the growth eﬀect of eliminating business cycles might be negative for high degrees
of risk aversion, the welfare eﬀect is always positive since the equilibrium allocation is the
solution to a one-agent decision problem.
In addition to the qualitative analysis, this paper also provides a quantitative assessment
of the growth and welfare consequences of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The quantitative
analysis assumes that the elimination of business cycles eliminates both the ﬂuctuations in
aggregate productivity and the variation in idiosyncratic human capital risk, and the model
economy is calibrated so that the implied variation in idiosyncratic labor income risk in the
economy with business cycles matches the estimates obtained by recent empirical studies
(Storesletten et al., 2001a, and Meghir and Pistaferri, 2001). The general ﬁnding is that
even for moderate degrees of risk aversion (around one), business cycle ﬂuctuations have a
substantial impact on investment, growth, and welfare. In particular, the welfare gain from
eliminating business cycles is almost two orders of magnitude larger than what Lucas (1987)
has found for the complete-markets exchange economy. Most of the welfare gain is due to
the elimination of the variation in idiosyncratic human capital risk, which improves welfare
for two reasons: it eliminates the variation in the volatility of individual consumption growth
and, for moderate degrees of risk aversion, it increases average consumption growth. Both
of these welfare eﬀects are substantial, but the volatility eﬀect is somewhat stronger. In
short, even without an endogenous output response (exchange economy) the welfare costs
of business cycles are quite large once market incompleteness is introduced, but taking into
account the endogeneity of output (production economy) increases the cost even further.
The welfare costs of business cycles found in this paper are much larger than the welfare
costs found by Imrohoroglu (1989) and Krusell and Smith (1999), and also larger than the
costs found by Storesletten et al.(2001b). In accordance with the current analysis, all these
3papers assume that the elimination of business cycles leads to an elimination of the variations
in idiosyncratic risk without aﬀecting the average level of idiosyncratic risk.3 However, there
are diﬀerences in modeling the interaction between business cycles and idiosyncratic risk
that account for a substantial part of the diversion of results.
First, this paper follows Storesletten et al. (2001b) and assumes that there are permanent
idiosyncratic income shocks. In contrast, Imrohoroglu (1989) and Krusell and Smith (1999)
only consider income shocks with moderate degree of persistence, which implies that indi-
vidual consumption ﬂuctuations are relatively small and temporary. Second, in this paper,
and to a certain extent also in Storesletten et al.(2001b), the level of aggregate economic
activity aﬀects the magnitude of idiosyncratic income losses. Put diﬀerently, this paper as-
sumes that recessions are not only times in which the probability of job displacement goes
up, but also times in which the cost of job displacement increases. In contrast, Imrohoroglu
(1989) and Krusell and Smith (1999) assume that the level of aggregate economic activity
only aﬀects the probability of job displacement, but not the magnitude of the income loss
experienced by displaced workers.4 As has been pointed out by Atkeson and Phelan (1994)
and Krusell and Smith (1999), in this case the elimination of business cycles only aﬀects the
equilibrium outcome if there are indirect price eﬀects, which are absent in the current model
and relatively small in Krusell and Smith (1999).
There is one feature of the present model that distinguishes it from all the previous
work on the welfare cost of business cycles in incomplete-market economies, namely that
3The notion that counter-cyclical stabilization policy reduces the variations in idiosyncratic risk without
aﬀecting the average amount of idiosyncratic risk can be made more precise using the integration principle
(Krusell and Smith, 1999) discussed in Section III. Beaudry and Page (2001) assume that the elimination of
business cycles removes all uninsurable idiosyncratic risk.
4Clearly, the displacement probability increases during an economic downturn. However, there are also
good reasons to expect the size of the income loss to be aﬀected: the distribution of employment opportunities
worsens inducing the unemployed worker to accept lower wage oﬀers and to increase the average time of
search.
4business cycles are detrimental to economic growth (at least for moderate degrees of risk
aversion). In contrast, the previous incomplete-markets literature has relied on a framework
that either disregards the output response to changes in business cycle activity (Imrohoroglu,
1989) or implies that the elimination of business cycles decreases output due to a reduction
in precautionary saving (Krusell and Smith, 1999, and Storesletten et al., 2001b). This
growth eﬀect is yet another reason why the welfare cost of business cycles reported here
are substantially larger than the cost found by the previous incomplete-markets literature
(including Storesletten et al., 2001b).
This paper emphasizes the normative analysis of business cycles. However, the human
capital model with incomplete markets has also several interesting positive implications. In
particular, it provides one of the few attempts in the literature to explain formally the ob-
served negative relationship between macroeconomic volatility and economic growth (Ramey
and Ramey, 1995).5 Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999) study this relationship within
the context of the complete-markets version of the human capital model, in which case
business cycles may aﬀect total investment, but not the ratio of physical to human capital.
Barlevy (2000) shows that a negative relationship between aggregate volatility and economic
growth may arise in a representative-agent model with endogenous technological innovation
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) discuss a model in which
non-diversiﬁable entrepreneurial risk aﬀects aggregate volatility and economic growth. Fi-
nally, Boldrin and Rustichini (1994) discuss the relationship between growth and ﬂuctuations
using a model with deterministic fundamentals and indeterminate equilibria.
5But see also Kormendi and Meguire (1985) for the opposite ﬁnding. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and
Quah (1993) ﬁnd a strong negative link between per capita income and volatility of growth.
5II. Model
II.A. Economy
Consider a discrete-time inﬁnite-horizon economy with i =1 ,...,I households. A complete
description of the exogenous state of the economy in period t is a vector (s1t,...,s It,S t),
where we interpret sit as a household-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) shock and St as an economy-wide
(aggregate) shock. The vector of idiosyncratic shocks is denoted by st =( s1t,...,s It), and a
(partial) history of idiosyncratic, respectively aggregate, shocks by st =( s0,...,s t), respec-
tively St =( S0,...,S t). We assume that idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are identically
and independently distributed over time (unpredictable) and that idiosyncratic shocks are
identically distributed across households (households are ex-ante identical). That is, we as-
sume π(st+1,S t+1|st,St)=π(st+1,S t+1)a n dπ(...,s i1,...,s jt,...)=π(...,s jt,...,s it,...).
There is one non-perishable good that can be either consumed or invested, and there
is one ﬁrm that produces this “all-purpose” good. If the ﬁrm employs Kt units of physi-
cal capital and Ht units of human capital in period t, then it produces Yt = AtF(Kt,H t)
units of the good in period t. Here F is a standard neoclassical production function. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that F displays constant-returns-to-scale, is twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes F(0,H)=F(K,0) = 0 as well as
limK→0 Fk(K,H) = limH→0 Fh(K,H)=+ ∞ and limK→∞ Fk(K,H) = limH→∞ Fh(K,H)=
0 . Total factor productivity is a function A : S → IR ++ that assigns to each aggregate state
St a (strictly positive) productivity level At = A(St). The ﬁrm rents input factors (physical
and human capital) in competitive markets. We denote the rental rate of physical capital
by ˜ rkt and the rental rate of human capital (the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor) by
˜ rht. In each period, the ﬁrm hires capital and labor up to the point where current proﬁt is
maximized. Thus, the ﬁrm solves the following static maximization problem:
maxKt,Ht {AtF(Kt,H t) − ˜ rktKt − ˜ rhtHt } (1)
6Let kit and hit stand for the stock of physical and human capital owned by household i at
the beginning of period t, and denote the corresponding investment levels by xkit and xhit.
If we denote household i s consumption by cit, then the sequential budget constraint reads:
cit + xkit + xhit =˜ rktkit +˜ rhthit (2)
ki,t+1 =( 1 − δkt)kit + xkit ,k it ≥ 0
hi,t+1 =( 1 − δht + ηit)hit + xhit ,h it ≥ 0
(ki0,h i0) given .
In (2) δkt and δht denote the average depreciation rate of human and physical capital,
respectively. These average depreciation rates are deﬁned by functions δk : S → IR + and
δh : S → IR + assigning to each aggregate shock St  S a deprecation rate δkt = δk(St),
respectively δht = δh(St). The term ηit denotes a household-speciﬁc shock to the stock of
human capital and is deﬁned by a function η : s × S → I R assigning to each (s,S) s × S
a realization ηit = η(sit,S t). We assume E[ηit|St]=0 . 6 Since ˜ rhtηit is labor income of
household i, the random variable ηit determines the nature of idiosyncratic labor income
risk.
The budget constraint (2) makes four implicit assumptions. First, it does not impose
a non-negativity constraint on human capital investment. Second, it does not distinguish
between general and speciﬁc human capital. In other words, ηit can be either a shock to
general human capital or a shock to speciﬁc human capital. Third, it neglects the labor-
leisure choice of workers. Finally, it models human capital investment as direct expenditures.
See Krebs (2002) for a detailed discussion of these assumptions.
The current paper emphasizes variations of the distribution of ηit over the business cycle.
6Of course, we restrict the depreciation functions so that the depreciation rate of physical and human
capital never exceeds 100 percent.
7In particular, the empirical evidence suggests that the dispersion of ηit increases during an
economic downturn. One interpretation of this increase in dispersion is that realizations
ηit < 0 correspond to the loss of ﬁrm- or sector-speciﬁc human capital experienced by
displaced workers, and that these losses become more likely and/or more severe during
economic downturns. Notice that the budget constraint (2) assumes that the wage is paid
in each period. Thus, the current version of the model disregards the forgone wage during
the period of unemployment and focuses instead on the (permanent) wage loss due to the
diﬀerence between the wage before job displacement and the starting wage after a new job
has been found. Empirically, the permanent component of this wage diﬀerential is quite
large (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, Neal 1995, and Topel 1991).
To simplify the analysis, we do not explicitly mention ﬁnancial markets. However, the
equilibrium allocation of the above economy in which households accumulate physical capital
is also the equilibrium allocation of a stock market economy in which the ﬁrm is a stock
company that makes the intertemporal investment decision.7 If we normalize the number
of outstanding shares to one, the stock price is Qt = Kt+1,h o u s e h o l di s equity share is
θi,t+1Qt = ki,t+1, and the return to equity investment is ˜ rkt − δkt. Moreover, the equilibrium
allocation is unchanged if households are given the opportunity to trade j =1 ,...,J se-
curities in zero net supply with payoﬀs Djt = Dj(St). In particular, the introduction of a
risk-free asset in zero net supply (borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate) will not change
the equilibrium allocation (Krebs 2002).
The budget constraint can be rewritten in a way that shows how the households’s op-
7In general, this type of market arrangement might lead to conceptual problems when markets are incom-
plete because shareholders (households) do not agree on the optimal investment policy (Magill and Quinzii,
1996). This, however, is not the case for the economy analyzed in this paper since here we have agreement
among shareholders in the sense that the equilibrium investment policy maximizes the expected present
discounted value of one-period proﬁts using any household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to
discount future proﬁts.
8timization problem is basically a standard intertemporal portfolio choice problem. To this
end, deﬁne the following variables: wit
. = kit + hit (total wealth) and ˜ kit
. = kit/hit (the
capital-to-labor ratio). With this new notation, the fraction of total wealth invested in
physical capital is ˜ kit/(1 + ˜ kit) and the fraction of total wealth invested in human capital is
1/(1 + ˜ kit). Introduce further the following (average) rate of returns on the two investment
opportunities: rkt
. =˜ rkt − δkt and rht












wit − cit (3)
wit ≥ 0 , ˜ kit ≥ 0 ,
(wi0,˜ ki0) given .
Households have identical preferences over consumption plans {cit}. These preferences
allow for a time-additive expected utility representation:
U({cit})=E






Moreover, we assume that the one-period utility function, u,i sg i v e nb yu(c)=c1−γ
1−γ ,γ =1 ,
or u(c)=logc, that is, preferences exhibit constant degree of relative risk aversion γ.
II.B. Equilibrium
In general, a sequential equilibrium is a process of prices (returns) and actions deﬁned by
a sequence of functions mapping histories,(st,St), into current prices and actions so that i)
the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt, ii) households maximize expected lifetime utility, and iii) markets
clear. In this paper, however, we are only interested in sequential equilibria with a recursive
(Markov) structure. Indeed, in this paper we focus attention on recursive equilibria that are
stationary in the sense that the ratio of physical to human capital, ˜ Kt
. = Kt/Ht, is constant.
We now outline how to construct such an equilibrium. Details and proofs can be found in
Krebs (2002).
9In equilibrium, aggregate returns on physical and human capital investment are given by
the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the static proﬁt maximization problem (1)
rk( ˜ K,St)=A(St)f
 ( ˜ K) − δk(St)( 5 )
rh( ˜ K,St)=A(St)f( ˜ K) − ˜ Kf
 ( ˜ K) − δh(St) ,
where we introduced the intensive-form production function f = f( ˜ K)w i t hf( ˜ K) . = F( ˜ K,1).
Given the return functions deﬁned in (5), from the budget constraint (3) it immediately
follows that in a stationary recursive equilibrium any individually optimal plan is generated
by a policy function g :I R + × s × S → IR
3
+ that assigns to each state (wit,s it,S t)a na c t i o n









= ˜ K. (6)
Notice that (6) simply says that the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio chosen by households
must be equal to the capital-to-labor ratio chosen by the ﬁrm.8
A stationary recursive equilibrium can be found by considering an economy with no
ﬁnancial markets and ”home-production” by each household (farmer) using the production
function F and facing both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. That is, equilibrium investment










s.t. : cit + xkit + xhit = AtF(kit,h it)
ki,t+1 =( 1 − δkt)kit + xkit ,k it ≥ 0
hi,t+1 =( 1 − δht + ηit)hit + xiht ,h it ≥ 0
(ki0,h i0)given ,
8Notice that this condition in conjunction with the individual budget constraint (2) implies goods market





1−γ , γ  =1 ,o ru(cit)=logcit. The stochastic productivity and de-
preciation parameters in (7) are again deﬁned by functions At = A(St), δkt = δk(St),
δht = δh(St), and ηit = η(sit,S t). The transition probabilities of the Markov process
{sit,S t} satisfy π(si,t+1,S t+1|sit,S t)=π(si,t+1,S t+1|St) and are derived from the transi-
tion probabilities of the joint Markov process {st,S t} using the formula π(si,t+1,S t+1|St)=
 
−i π(s1,t+1,...,s I,t+1,S t+1|St). Because of our previous assumption that the transition
probabilities are symmetric with respect to households, these marginal transition probabili-
ties are the same for all households.
Krebs (2002) shows that the solution to the autarky problem (7) exists if the following
condition




< 1( 8 )
is satisﬁed9, and that this solution is also the equilibrium allocation of the market economy
described above. In this equilibrium, all households choose the same capital-to-labor ratio,
˜ k, and consumption-to-wealth ratio, ˜ c = cit/(1 + rit)wit, and the equilibrium values of these
ratio variables are given by
E












 1−γ  1/γ
,
where the functions rh and rk are deﬁned as in (5) and r(˜ k,si,S)=
 








. The evolution of individual consumption, capital (invest-











9Condition (8) ensure the existence of a solution, but does not ensure that the solution exhibits positive








Finally, expected lifetime utility can be calculated by substituting the solution (10) into the
expression (4). This yields
E0

















 1−γ   γ  = 1 (11)
E0

















where ci0 =˜ c[1 + r(˜ k,si0,S 0)]wi0 is initial consumption and g the individual consumption
growth rate ci,t+1/cit = β[1 + r(˜ k,si,t+1,S t+1)]. Notice that in (8), (9), and (11) the ex-
pectation is taken over aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Notice also that for the case of
log-utility preferences, (8) reads β<1 and (9) implies ˜ c =1− β.
As mentioned before, the introduction of ﬁnancial assets j =1 ,...,J that are in zero
net supply and have payoﬀs Djt = Dj(St) will not change the equilibrium allocation. More
precisely, if we introduce these assets and modify the budget constraint (2) accordingly, then
at equilibrium prices
Qj = E [M(St+1)Dj(St+1)] , (12)
M(St+1)=βE
  
(1 + r(˜ k,si,t+1,S t+1))(1 − ˜ c)
 −γ 
.
households choose not to trade these assets (see Krebs 2002 for details). This no-trade result
is the extension of Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) to the case of a production economy. As
in Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), individual income growth rates a unpredictable, that
is, individual income follows a logarithmic random walk (see equation 15).
The expression (10) for individual equilibrium consumption implies that aggregate con-















12Thus, aggregate consumption growth rates are i.i.d., that is, aggregate consumption follows
(approximately) a logarithmic random walk and the risk-free rate is constant. Annual data
on real short-term interest rates and consumption show only small deviations from these
two properties (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). Given that this paper uses annual data
to calibrate the model economy (see below), the assumption of an i.i.d. aggregate process
seems therefore a reasonable ﬁrst approximation.
III. Qualitative Analysis
We are interested in the change in ˜ k and ˜ c, and the corresponding changes in growth
and welfare, when we move from an economy with business cycles to an economy without
business cycles. This amounts to ”removing” the aggregate shocks S, that is, replacing the
joint probabilities π(si,S) with probabilities π (si) and any function with values f(si,S)( d e -
scribing an exogenous economic variable in the economy with business cycles) by a function
with values f (si) (describing the same exogenous economic variable in the economy without
business cycles). The question that arises is what relationship holds between π and π  as
well as f and f . It seems natural to compute the probabilities in the economy without
business cycles as the simple marginals of the probabilities in the economy with business











In words: the value of each exogenous parameter in the economy without business cycles
is equal to the average value of the same parameter in the economy with business cycles,
10For random variables with uncountable support that have a probability density function, these two
conditions become π (si)=
 
π(si,S)dS and η (si)=
 
η(si,S)π(S|si)dS. More generally, the function f  is
deﬁned as f (si)=E[f(si,S)|si].
13where the average (expectation) is taken over the aggregate shocks. This procedure was ﬁrst
suggested by Krusell and Smith (1999) as a general principle guiding the analysis of business
cycle eﬀects in incomplete-markets economies, and is a generalization of the principle adopted
by Atkeson and Phelan (1994). Krusell and Smith (1999) call it the integration principle,
a terminology we will follow in this paper. Notice that this procedure ensures that the
random variable f is a mean-preserving spread of the random variable f , and in this sense
the economy with business cycle ﬂuctuations exhibits more risk with no change in the mean
of exogenous economic variables.
Applied to economic variables that have no idiosyncratic shock component, the integra-
tion principle is a natural extension of the original analysis conducted by Lucas (1987). For
example, if f = A, then the integration principle implies: A  =
 
S A(S)π(S). However,
when it comes to economic variables that directly depend on idiosyncratic shocks (in our
case η), then Lucas (1987) provides no clear guideline. To understand the economic meaning
behind the integration principle for such variables, we now turn to a simple example.
Suppose there are two aggregate states, S = L (low level of aggregate economic activity)
and S = H (high level of aggregate economic activity), that occur with probabilities π(L)
and π(H), respectively. Suppose further that there are two idiosyncratic states, si = b
and si = g, corresponding to a bad, respectively good, idiosyncratic shock. Finally, assume
that idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed across households: π(s1,...,s I,S)=
Πiπ(si,S). This is the structure used in Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith
(1999), where si = b is interpreted as unemployment and si = g as employment. Using
this interpretation, the conditional probability π(b|L) is the probability of being unemployed
when the economy is contracting and π(b|H) is the probability of being unemployed when the
economy is expanding. The integration principle implies π (b)=π(b|L)π(L)+π(b|H)+π(H).
In words: the probability of being unemployed in the economy without business cycles is
14equal to the average probability of being unemployed in the economy with business cycles.
So far, we have only discussed probabilities π. We now turn to the outcome function
η. The integration principle requires η (b)=η(b,L)π(L)+η(b,H)π(H). In words: the
loss of human capital (income) when unemployed in the economy without business cycle is
equal to the average loss of human capital (income) when unemployed in the economy with
business cycles. Both Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1999) use the
integration principle, but consider the special case η(b,L)=η(b,H), that is, they assume
that the human capital (income) loss is the same for all aggregate states. In this case, the
elimination of variations in idiosyncratic risk has no eﬀect on the equilibrium allocation and
welfare (proposition below). More generally, the integration principle in conjunction with
the assumption that aggregate shocks do not aﬀect the size of idiosyncratic shocks implies
neutrality. However, if η(b,L)  = η(b,H), then the elimination of variation in idiosyncratic
risk has an eﬀect on growth and welfare (proposition below). Notice also that in this example
the elimination of business cycles amounts to the elimination of the correlation of shocks
across individuals. Thus, the claim made by Atkeson and Phelan (1994) that eliminating the
correlation of shocks across individuals has no eﬀect is only correct if the outcome function
does not depend on aggregate shocks.
In summary, the integration principle deﬁnes in a unique way how to move from an
economy with business cycles to an economy without business cycles. However, the cost
of business cycles depends in a subtle way on the interaction between business cycles and
idiosyncratic risk, and diﬀerent modeling approaches (S aﬀects π vs S aﬀects η) can lead to
radically diﬀerent conclusions regarding the cost of business cycles. Moreover, in Appendix
2 we show that these diﬀerent approaches are observationally equivalent in the important
case of normally distributed idiosyncratic shocks.11
11Notice that even though the two approaches lead to very diﬀerent cost of business cycles, they have the
same implications for the equity premium (if the observational equivalence holds). Thus, there is no simple
15Proposition Assume that A(St)=A, δk(St)=δk,a n dδh(St)=δh. Consider two
economies, one economy with joint probabilities π(si,S) and idiosyncratic human capital
shocks η = η(si,S) (the economy with business cycles) and another economy with probabilities
π (si)=
 
S π(si,S) and idiosyncratic human capital shocks η (si)=
 
S η(si,S)π(S|si) (the
economy without business cycles). Then the following comparative dynamics results hold,
where all inequalities are strict if, and only if, the function η = η(si,S) depends in a non-
trivial way on S.
• Capital-to-labor ratio: ˜ k ≥ ˜ k 
• Average investment returns:
rk(˜ k) ≤ rk(˜ k
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link between the cost of business cycles and the equity premium. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) provide a





We consider a two-state aggregate shock process, S ∈{ L,H},w i t hπ(L)=π(H)=1 /2,
where L stands for low level of aggregate economic activity and H stands for high level of
aggregate economic activity. We assume that sit ∼ N(0,1) regardless of the aggregate shock,
S. That is, we assume π(si,S)=π(si)π(S), where π(si) is the density function of a normal
distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We further specify that η(si,L)=ση(L)si
and η(si,H)=ση(H)si.T h u s ,w eh a v eηit ∼ N(0,σ2
η(L)) if St = L and ηit ∼ N(0,σ2
η(H)) if
St = H. The assumption of normally distributed human capital shocks with S−dependent
variance allows us to relate the current model to recent empirical studies of idiosyncratic
labor income risk (see below). Moreover, the assumption that the aggregate state S enters in
a non-trivial manner into the function η = η(si,S) ensures that the elimination of variation
in idiosyncratic risk has an impact on the equilibrium allocation and welfare (see the propo-
sition in Section III). Indeed, the assumption that all variations in idiosyncratic risk are
due to the inﬂuence of S on the η-function tends to maximize the growth and welfare eﬀect
of variations in idiosyncratic risk. In this sense, the growth and welfare eﬀects of business
cycles reported in this section provide an upper bound. See the Appendix 2 for more details.
For the baseline economy, we assume log-utility preferences: γ =1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,˜ c =1−β
always solves the intertemporal Euler equation. We further assume a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function:f( ˜ K)=A(S) ˜ Kα. Aggregate depreciation rate of physical and human capital
are equal and may depend on the aggregate state: δkt = δht = δ(St). The introduction of
aggregate depreciation shocks allows us to match the volatility of both aggregate output and
17aggregate consumption. Without these aggregate depreciation shocks, the simple human
capital model analyzed here generates an excessively smooth aggregate consumption series
(Jones et al. 1999). An increase in the aggregate depreciation rate might be the result of an
increase in the rate of business failure if plant and business closure destroys speciﬁc physical
and human capital.
IV.B. Calibration
We calibrate the model economy as follows. We assume that the period length is one
year (annual data). This choice is made to ensure consistency with a number of empir-
ical studies that estimate individual labor income risk using annual PSID data (see be-
low). We choose α = .36 to match capital’s share in income. The remaining parameters
A(L),A(H),δ(L),δ(H),σ η(L),σ η(H), and β are determined in conjunction with the equilib-
rium value for ˜ k by the following restrictions:
• The remaining Euler equation holds
• E[δt]=.06




• σ [yhi,t+1/yhit|St = L]=.24 ,σ [yhi,t+1/yhit|St = H]=.12
The ﬁrst restriction ensures that the portfolio choice ˜ k is an equilibrium outcome. The
next restriction pins down the average depreciation rate. The value .06 is a compromise
18between the probably higher depreciation rate of physical capital12 and the probably lower
depreciation rate of human capital. This value is also assumed in Jones et al. (1999). The
next two restrictions ensure that the model generates a realistic average growth rate and
average saving rate, and the following two restrictions imply that the model matches the
observed volatility of aggregate consumption and output growth for the period 1949-1999.
The last restriction requires the model’s process for idiosyncratic labor income risk to be
consistent with the evidence form microeconomic data, to which we now turn.
Individual labor income is yhit =˜ rhthit.U s i n g ˜ rht =˜ rh(˜ k,St), the equilibrium law of
motion (10) for hit, and the approximation log(1 + r) ≈ r, we ﬁnd
logyhi,t+1 = φ(˜ k,St,S t+1)+logyhit +˜ ηit , (15)
where ˜ ηit = 1
1+˜ kηit. In other words, the idiosyncratic component of individual labor income
approximately follows a logarithmic random walk with error term ˜ ηit ∼ N(0,σ2
y(St)), where
σy(St)=ση(St)/(1 + ˜ k).13 The random walk speciﬁcation is often used by the empirical
literature to model the permanent component of idiosyncratic labor income risk (Carroll
and Samwick, 1997, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2001, and
Storesletten et.al., 2001a). Thus, their estimate of the standard deviation of the error term
for the random walk component of annual labor income corresponds to the value of σy(S).
For the average standard deviation, E[σy(S)], Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Hubbard et
al.(1995) estimate a value of .15, Meghir and Pistaferri (2001) ﬁnd an estimate of .19, and
Storesletten et al.(2001) have .25. For the baseline economy, we choose E[σy(S)] = .18.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2001) and Storesletten et al.(2001a) are the only studies so far that
12A common choice is δk = .10. However, Cooley and Prescott (1995) argue that δk = .05 is more realistic.
13We have ˜ ηit instead of ˜ ηi,t+1 in equation (15), and the latter is the common speciﬁcation for a random
walk. However, this is not a problem if the econometrician observes the idiosyncratic depreciation shocks
with a one-period lag. In this case, (15) is the correct equation from the household’s point of view, but a
modiﬁed version of (15) with ˜ ηi,t+1 replacing ˜ ηit is the speciﬁcation estimated by the econometrician.
19allow σy to vary with the aggregate state S. Meghir and Pistaferri (2001) estimate that
the variation in σy,m e a s u r e db yσ[σy(S)], is equal to .05. Storesletten et al.(2001b) ﬁnd
σ[σy(S)] = .10. For our baseline economy, we choose σ[σy(S)] = .06, but we also consider
an economy with σ[σy(S)] = .10. For the two-state aggregate process used in this section,
the two restrictions E[σy(S)] = .18 and σ[σy(S)] = .06 translate into σy(L)=.24 and
σy(H)=.12.
The above approach might underestimate human capital risk if the lower tail of the actual
distribution of idiosyncratic income shocks is fatter than suggested by the normal distribution
framework. For strong evidence for such a deviation from the normal-distribution framework,
see Brav, Constantinides, and Greczy (2002) and Geweke and Keane (2000). There is,
however, also an argument that the current approach might overestimate human capital
risk because it assumes that all of labor income is return to human capital investment. If
some component of labor income is independent of human capital investment, and if this
component is random (random endowment of genetic skills), then some part of the variance
of labor income is not human capital risk.
Equilibria are computed using a simple two-state approximation of the normally distrib-
uted random variable η. More speciﬁcally, we replace the random variable η ∼ N(0,σ η(S))
by a discrete random variable with two possible realizations, −ση(S)a n d+ ση(S), which
occur with equal probability. This approximation procedure will be used throughout this
section to compute equilibria. The implied parameter values for the baseline economy are
A(L)=.2869, A(H)=.3001, δ(L)=.0756, δ(H)=.0444, β = .9364.
The above calibration procedure ensures that the model economy matches as many fea-
tures of the U.S. economy as there are free parameters. It is also interesting to investigate
how the calibrated model performs in matching additional features of the U.S. economy. For
example, the implied value for the average return on physical capital is E[rk(S)] = 5.55%.
20This is higher than the observed real interest rate on short-term US government bonds, but
lower than the observed real return on U.S. equity.14 The model’s equity premium is .06
percent, which is a substantial improvement over the value found in Mehra and Prescott
(1985) for logarithmic utility (.003 percent), but still very far away from the observed value
for the U.S. stock market (7 percent). The model’s Sharpe ratio, however, comes much closer
to its observed counterpart (3.5 versus 35). Put diﬀerently, equity returns are excessively
smooth in the model economy, and the implied equity premium is therefore quite small.
The implied average return on investment in human capital, E[rh(S)] = 11.92%, is in line
with the estimates of rate of returns to schooling.15 Notice that the implied excess return
on human capital investment is E[rh(S)] − E[rk(S)] = 6.37%. Thus, the model generates a
substantial ”human capital premium”.
Finally, notice that conditional on the aggregate shock, individual consumption growth
is normally distributed, gi,t+1 = ci,t+1/cit−1 ∼ N(µg(St+1),σ2
g(St+1)). The calibrated model
yields an average standard deviation of consumption growth of σg = .5σg(L)+.5σg(H)=
16.83%. This amount of consumption volatility is somewhat lower than what is found in
the data. For example, using CEX data on consumption of non-durables and services Brav
et al.(2002) ﬁnd that the standard deviation of quarterly consumption growth ranges from
6 percent to 12 percent for diﬀerent household groups with an average of about 9 percent.
If quarterly consumption growth is i.i.d., then this corresponds to a standard deviation of
annual consumption growth of 18 percent.
IV.C. Results
Applying the integration principle discussed in Section III to the case analyzed in this section,
14The RBC literature usually strikes a compromise and chooses the parameter values so that the implied
return on capital is 4%, which is somewhat lower than the value used here.
15The estimates vary considerably across households and studies, with an average of about 10% (Krueger
and Lindhal, 2001).
21we ﬁnd that the elimination of business cycles amounts to replacing the functions A = A(S)
and δ = δ(S) by the constants A  = .5A(L)+.5A(H)a n dδ  = .5δ(L)+.5δ(H). Further-
more, the function η = η(si,S) is replaced by the function η (si)=.5η(si,L)+.5η(si,H)=
.5(ση(L)+ση(H)) si. In particular, this means that the elimination of business cycles
changes the process of human capital risk from the heteroscedastic process {ηit},w h e r e
ηit ∼ N(0,σ2
η(St)), to the homoscedastic process {η 




The ﬁrst three rows in table 1 report the growth and welfare gains from eliminating busi-
ness cycles, which are calculated as follows. Let {cit} stand for the individual consumption
process in the equilibrium with business cycles. This process is deﬁned by an initial con-
sumption level, ci0, and a sequence of individual consumption growth rates, {git},t h a ta r e
distributed according to git ∼ N(µg(St),σ2
g(St)) with St = L,H. When business cycles are
removed, a new equilibrium is established with individual consumption process {c 
it} deﬁned
by an initial consumption level c 
i0 and a sequence of growth rates, {g 
it}, that are distrib-
uted according to g 
it ∼ N(µ 
g,σ2
g
 ). The ﬁrst row in table 1 shows the eﬀect of eliminating
business cycles on average per capita consumption growth, that is, it reports the diﬀerence
∆µg = µ 
g−µg,w h e r eµg = .5µg(L)+.5µg(H). The second row in table 1 reports the welfare
gains from eliminating business cycles expressed in equivalent consumption-level terms with
(production economy) and without (exchange economy) the change in the average growth
rate. These welfare gains are calculated as follows.
Expected lifetime utility associated with the consumption plan {cit} or {c 
it} is given by
(11). The welfare cost of business cycles expressed in compensating consumption diﬀerential
is the fraction of initial consumption, ∆c, an agent is willing to give up in return for the
16Storesletten et al.(2001b) also assume that idiosyncratic shocks are normally distributed in both
economies (with and without business cycles), and that the removal of business cycles changes the het-
eroscedastic distribution to a homoscedastic distributions. They, however, assume that σ2
η












1 − βE[(1 + g)1−γ]
γ  = 1 (16)
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1 − β
E [log(1 + g
 )] = logci0 +
β
1 − β
E [log(1 + g)] ,
where the random variables g and g  are deﬁned in the preceding paragraph.17 Notice that
the expectations in (16) extends over idiosyncratic risk and, in the case of business cycles,
aggregate risk. Assuming ci0 = c 
i0,18 equation (15) yields
∆c =1 −
 
1 − βE[(1 + g )1−γ]
1 − βE[(1 + g)1−γ]
  1
1−γ





 )] − E[log(1 + g)]])
Notice that the expression (17) is independent of ci0. Thus, the welfare gain expressed in
equivalent consumption terms is the same for all households. The second row in table 1
records the total welfare gain of eliminating business cycles using (17) and a growth rate
g  ∼ N(µ 
g,σ2
g
 ), where µ 
g and σ2
g
  are the mean and variance of individual consumption
growth after business cycles are eliminated. The third row reports the welfare gain for ﬁxed
average consumption growth, that is, we assume µ 
g = µg.
Table 1 shows that the growth eﬀect of eliminating business cycles is positive and non-
negligible: .07 percent for the baseline economy and .21 percent for the economy with large
variations in idiosyncratic risk. Most of the increase in growth is due to the elimination
of variation in idiosyncratic risk. However, in contrast to the complete-markets model, in
the model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk the elimination of aggregate productivity and
depreciation shocks has an impact on growth.
17Equation (16) expresses the welfare change in terms of compensating diﬀerential (variation). In the
current model, this is the same as expressing the welfare change in terms of equivalent variation.
18This amounts to assuming that households cannot readjust their choices in the same period in which
business cycles are eliminated. Note, however, that the quantitative results are barely changed if one assumes
that ci0 is aﬀected since ci0 =( 1− β)(1 + ri0)wi0 and 1 − β is small.
23The second row in table 1 shows that the welfare costs of business cycles are quite large:
3.21 percent of initial consumption for the baseline economy and 7.48 percent for the econ-
omy with large variations in idiosyncratic risk. This is an order of magnitude large than
the welfare cost in the corresponding complete-markets economy, and almost two orders of
magnitude larger than the .1 percent originally found by Lucas (1987).19 Ac o m p a r i s o no f
cases a and b reveals that ﬂuctuations in aggregate productivity and depreciation only have
a moderate eﬀect on welfare, and that most of the welfare cost of business cycles is due to the
variation in idiosyncratic risk. Thus, even if aggregate consumption growth were constant
(no aggregate productivity and depreciation shocks), the model still generates welfare costs
of business cycles that are almost two orders of magnitude larger than the ones found by
Lucas (1987).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the elimination of variation in idiosyncratic risk aﬀects
welfare in two ways: it eliminates the variation in the volatility of individual consumption
growth and it increases average consumption growth (if γ is not too large). To compare the
magnitude of these two eﬀects, the third row of table 1 reports the welfare gain of eliminating
business cycles for ﬁxed average consumption growth (ﬁxed µg). A comparison of the second
and third row in table 1 shows that both channels are important, although the elimination in
the variation of individual consumption volatility has a somewhat stronger eﬀect on welfare.
Table 1 also shows the eﬀect of business cycles on asset returns and investment. Notice
that these eﬀects are quite substantial. The strong asset return eﬀect indicates that general
equilibrium eﬀects are very important. Indeed, the growth eﬀect of business cycles is much
larger if we consider a partial equilibrium model with ﬁxed asset returns. For example, for
19Notice that Lucas (1987) ﬁnds a welfare cost of only .1 percent for a complete-markets economy with log-
utility preferences, whereas this paper ﬁnds .43 percent. This diﬀerence is due to the fact that in this paper
aggregate consumption follows a logarithmic random walk, whereas Lucas (1987) assumes that aggregate
consumption is trend-stationary.
24the baseline economy the growth eﬀect increases to .49 percent.
Finally, we investigate to what extent our results depend on the degree of relative risk
aversion. Tables 2 and 3 show the results for γ = .5a n dγ =1 .5, respectively. Not
surprisingly, for γ = .5 the growth eﬀect is larger than for γ = 1 since in the former case the
elimination of business cycles has a positive eﬀect on total investment. Correspondingly, for
γ =1 .5 the growth eﬀect is diminished since total investment is reduced. Notice also that
even though an increase in γ reduces the growth enhancing eﬀect of eliminating business
cycles, the total welfare gain is roughly constant since an increase in γ increases the welfare
beneﬁt from reducing variations in individual consumption volatility. In this sense, the
welfare cost of business cycles reported in this paper are relatively robust to moderate changes
in the degree of relative risk aversion.
V. Conclusion
This paper has used a tractable macroeconomic model with idiosyncratic human capital
risk and incomplete markets to analyze the qualitative and quantitative eﬀects of business
cycles on growth and welfare. The qualitative analysis has shown that the elimination of
variations in idiosyncratic risk decreases the ratio of physical to human capital and increases
the total investment return and welfare. Moreover, it was shown that growth is always
enhanced if the degree of relative risk aversion is less than or equal to one. The quantitative
analysis revealed that even for relatively small degrees of risk aversion, the elimination of
business cycles has substantial eﬀects on investment in physical and human capital, economic
growth, and welfare.
The current paper does not address the issue of why certain insurance markets for idio-
syncratic human capital risk are missing. One possible explanation for this lack of insurance
might be the asymmetry of information with respect to idiosyncratic human capital shocks.
25An interesting question for future research is to investigate under what conditions the equi-
librium allocation of the incomplete-markets economy is also the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion of an economy with asymmetric/private information. The results by Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) taken together show that the relationship between
competitive allocations and constrained-eﬃcient allocations crucially depends on the nature
of private information.
This paper has followed the previous literature by assuming that a reduction in business
cycle activity will lead to a decrease in the variation in idiosyncratic risk, but has not at-
tempted to go beyond the existing literature by providing an explicit model of the interaction
between business cycles and idiosyncratic risk. Developing such a model is likely to lead to
additional insights into the welfare costs of business cycles, and is an important topic for
future research.
26Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition
We begin with the case in which η is constant across diﬀerent S-realizations. For the
economy analyzed in this paper, the equilibrium allocation is the solution to the one-agent
decision problem with values of ˜ k and ˜ c determined by (9). The solution to the equation
system (9), however, is the same for all joint probability distributions π(si,S) satisfying
 
S π(si,S)=π (si) for ﬁxed marginal probabilities π (si) since none of the functions rk, rh,
η,a n dr that enter into (9) depend on S. Hence, the elimination of business cycles has no
eﬀect on the allocation since it simply amounts to replacing the joint probabilities π(si,S)
by the marginal probabilities π (si)=
 
S π(si,S). It also has no eﬀect on welfare because
expected lifetime utility (11) is unchanged.20
Suppose now η(si,S)  = η(si,S )f o rs o m esi,S,S . Deﬁne
ϕ(˜ k,η) . =




The Euler equation (9) determining ˜ k then reads E[ϕ(˜ k,η(si,S))] = 0. Let ˜ k be the solution













It is straightforward to show that rh(˜ k) >r k(˜ k) (agents are risk averse and human capital
investment is riskier than physical capital investment). Using this and that rh is increasing
20The proof still goes through if the state process follows a general Markov process as long as St is not
useful in predicting si,t+1 (an assumption that is implicit in the set-up of the current model because we
assume that idiosyncratic shocks are unpredictable). However, if St contains information about si,t+1,t h e n
the optimal investment decision in general depends on St, and changes in the joint probabilities will aﬀect
the equilibrium outcome even for ﬁxed marginal probabilities. Notice also that the proof of the neutrality
result hinges on the assumption that preferences allow for an expected utility representation (independence
axiom) and that S does not directly enter into the utility function (no taste shocks). Finally, we note that
the neutrality result does not hold if the equilibrium allocation is not the solution to a one-agent decision
problem (indirect price eﬀects).
27and rk is decreasing in ˜ k, we ﬁnd that the function ϕ is increasing in ˜ k and convex in η.
































Combining (A1) and (A2) we therefore conclude that E[ϕ(˜ k,η (si))] <E [ϕ(˜ k ,η (si))], which
implies that ˜ k>˜ k  because ϕ is decreasing in ˜ k. This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
The statements about returns and investment then follow immediately.
It is left to show that the statement about ˜ c is true (the growth-rate eﬀect then im-
mediately follows). From the formula for ˜ c we infer that we need to discuss the eﬀect on
E
 
(1 + r(˜ k,η(si,S)))1−γ
 
. There are two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect (change in η) and an indirect
eﬀect due to the change in ˜ k. Recall that the movement from η to η  decreases ˜ k and that
r is decreasing in ˜ k .F o r γ<1, both eﬀects decrease the expression because in this case
(1 + r)1−γ is a concave and increasing function of r. For γ>1, both eﬀects increase the
expression because in this case (1+r)1−γ is a convex and decreasing function of r. From this
the statement about ˜ c follows. This completes the proof of proposition 3.
Appendix 2: Normally Distributed Idiosyncratic Shocks
This appendix discusses the important case of normally distributed idiosyncratic shocks.
As in section IV, we assume that there are two aggregate states, S ∈{ L,H}, that occur
with probability π(L)a n d1− π(H), respectively. We also assume that in the economy
with business cycles idiosyncratic human capital shocks are conditionally normally distrib-
uted: ηi ∼ N(0,σ2
η(L)) if S = L and ηi ∼ N(0,σ2
η(H)) if S = H.W es h o w n e x th o w t h i s
“observed” family of distributions can be generated in two diﬀerent ways, and how these dif-
28ferent approaches give rise to diﬀerent answers regarding the welfare cost of business cycles
even if we apply the same integration principle.
Approach 1.
In contrast to the assumption made in Section IV, assume that η(si,S)=η (si)=si.T h u s ,
aggregate shocks do not aﬀect the η-function, and the proposition therefore implies that the
elimination of business cycles has no eﬀect on the equilibrium allocation and welfare. If we
assume that ηi = si ∼ N(0,σ2
η(L)) if S = L and ηi = si ∼ N(0,σ2
η(H)) if S = H,t h e n
we clearly match the “observed” distribution of idiosyncratic human capital shocks. Notice
that the application of the integration principle leads to π (si)=π(si|L)π(L)+π(si|H)π(H),
where π(si|L), respectively π(si|H), is the density function of a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation ση(L), respectively ση(H). Thus, when we eliminate business
cycles, we move from an economy with heteroscedastic and normally distributed idiosyncratic
shocks to an economy with non-normally distributed idiosyncratic shocks (the mixture of
two normal distributions).
Approach 2.
In accordance with the assumption made in Section IV, assume that probabilities are inde-
pendent of business cycle activity, π(si,S)=π1(si)π2(S), choose si ∼ N(0,1), and match the
“observed” distribution of idiosyncratic human capital shocks by letting η(si,L)=ση(L)si
and η(si,H)=ση(H)si. This case is discussed in Section IV. Clearly, it does not lead to
neutrality of business cycles.
29References
Acemoglu, D., and F. Zilibotti (1997) “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk,
Diversiﬁcation, and Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 105: 709-751.
Aghion,P., and P. Howitt (1982) “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction,”
Econometrica 60: 323-352.
Alvarez, F., and U. Jermann (2000) “Using Asset Prices to Measure the Cost of Business
Cycles,” Working Paper, University of Chicago.
Alvarez, F., and N. Stokey (1998) “Dynamic Programming with Homogeneous Func-
tions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 82: 167-189.
Atkeson, A., and Lucas, R. (1992) “On the Eﬃcient Distribution with Private Informa-
tion,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59: 427-453.
Atkeson, A., and C. Phelan (1994) “Reconsidering the Cost of Business Cycles with
Incomplete Markets,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp.
187-207.
Barlevy, G. (2000) “Evaluating the Costs of Business Cycles in Models of Endogenous
Growth,” Working Paper, Northwestern University.
Beaudry, P., and C. Pages (2001) “The Cost of Business Cycles and the Stabilization
Value of Unemployment Insurance,” European Economic Review, 45: 1545-1572.
Boldrin, M. and A. Rustichini (1994) “Growth and Indeterminacy in Dynamic Models
with Externalities,” Econometrica, 62: 332-392.
Brav, A., Constantinides, G. and C. Grezcy (2002) “Asset Pricing with Heterogenous
Consumers and Limited Participation: Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy
forthcoming.
Caballe, J., and M. Santos, (1993) “On Endogenous Growth with Physical and Human
Capital,” Journal of Political Economy, 101: 1042-67.
Campbell, J., and J. Cochrane (1999) “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Expla-
nation of Aggregate Stock-Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 107: 205-251.
Carroll, C. and A. Samwick (1997) “The Nature of Precautionary Saving,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 40: 41-72.
Cole, H., and N. Kocherlakota (2001) “Eﬃcient Allocations with Hidden Income and
Hidden Storage,” Review of Economic Studies, 68: 523-542.
Constantinides, G. and D. Duﬃe (1996) “Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers,”
Journal of Political Economy, 104: 219-240.
30Cooley, T. and E. Prescott (1995) “Economic Growth and Business Cycles,” in Cooley,
T. (ed) Frontiers in Business Cycle Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey.
Geweke, J. and M. Keane (2000) “An Empirical Analysis of Male Income Dynamics in
the PSID: 1968-1989,” Journal of Econometrics 96: 293-356.
Hubbard, R., Skinner, J. and S. Zeldes (1995) “Precautionary Saving and Social Insur-
ance”, Journal of Political Economy, 103: 360-399.
Jacobson, L., LaLonde, R., and D. Sullivan (1993) “Earnings Losses of Displaced Work-
ers,” American Economic Review 83: 685-709.
Imrohoroglu, A. (1989) “Costs of Business Cycles with Indivisibilities and Liquidity Con-
straints,” Journal of Political Economy, 1364-83.
Jones, L. and Manuelli,R. “A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth: Theory and Policy
Implications,” Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1008-1038.
Jones, L., Manuelli, R. and E. Stacchetti (1999) “Technology and Policy Shocks in Models
of Endogenous Growth,” NBER Working Paper # 7063.
Jovanovic, B. “Firm-Speciﬁc Capital and Turnover,” Journal of Political Economy 87:
1246-60.
Kormendi, R. and P. Meguire (1985) “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-
Country Evidence,” Journal of Monetary Economics 16: 141-163.
Krebs, T. (2001) “Human Capital Risk and Economic Growth,” Working Paper, Brown
University; forthcoming in The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Krebs, T. (2002) “Recursive Equilibrium in Endogenous Growth Models with Incomplete
Markets,” Working Paper, Brown University.
Krueger, A., and M. Lindhal (2001) “Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?,”
Journal of Economic Literature 39: 1101-1136.
Krusell, P., and A. Smith (1999) “On the Welfare Eﬀects of Business Cycles,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 2: 247-272.
Lazear, E. (1990) ”Job Security Provisions and Employment,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105: 699-726.
Ljungqvist, L. and T. Sargent (1998) “The European Unemployment Dilemma,” Journal
of Political Economy 106: 514-550.
Lucas, R. Models of Business Cycles. New York: Blackwell, 1987.
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary
31Economics, 22: 3-42.
Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1996) Theory of Incomplete Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Meghir, C. and L. Pistaferri (2001) “Income Variance Dynamics and Heterogeneity,”
Working Paper, Stanford University.
Neal, D. (1995) “Industry-Speciﬁc Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers,”
Journal of Labor Economics 13: 653-677.
Quah, D. (1993) “Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth,” European
Economic Review 37: 426-34.
Ramey, G. and V. Ramey (1995) “Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility
and Growth,” American Economic Review, 85: 1138-51.
Rebelo, S. (1991) “Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political
Economy 99: 500-521.
Storesletten, K., Telmer, C. and A. Yaron (2001a) “Asset Pricing with Idiosyncratic Risk
and Overlapping Generations,” Working Paper, Carnegie-Mellon University.
Storesletten, K., Telmer, C., and A. Yaron (2001b) “The Welfare Cost of Business Cycles
Revisited: Finite Lives and Cyclical Variations in Idiosyncratic Risk,” European Economic
Review.
Topel, R. (1991) “Speciﬁc Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority,”
Journal of Political Economy 99: 145-176.
32TABLE 1. Business cycle eﬀects for γ = 1 (log-utility)
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3
∆µg .012 % .071 % .024 % .210 % 0 %
∆c1 .693 % 3.21 % .923 % 7.48 % .435 %
∆c2 .513 % 2.16 % .604 % 4.65 % .435 %
∆Xk/Y -.090 % -.58 % -.14 % -2.02 % 0 %
∆Xh/Y .13 % .79 % .20 % 1.97 % 0 %
∆rk .06 % .38 % .10 % .99 % 0 %
∆rh -.05 % -.32 % -.09 % -.88 % 0 %
TABLE 2. Business cycle eﬀects for γ = .5
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3
∆µg .022 % .123 % .040 % .379 % .007 %
∆c1 .756 % 3.99 % 1.01 % 9.45 % .392 %
∆c2 .327 % 1.65 % .413 % 3.82 % .197 %
∆Xk/Y -.015 % -.048 % .013 % -.141 % .023 %
∆Xh/Y .168 % 1.05 % .261 % 2.66 % .041 %
∆rk .031 % .231 % .053 % .615 % 0 %
∆rh -.022 % -.161 % -.039 % -.436 % 0 %
TABLE 3. Business cycle eﬀects for γ =1 .5
Case 1a 1b 2a 2b 3
∆µg .005 % .049 % .089 % .192 % -.005 %
∆c1 .648 % 2.65 % .858 % 5.93 % .392 %
∆c2 .592 % 2.07 % .627 % 3.98 % .589 %
∆Xk/Y -.199 % -.980 % -.653 % -4.03 % -.020 %
∆Xh/Y .131 % % .765 % 3.23 % -.037 %
∆rk .100 % .545 % .401 % 2.63 % 0 %
∆rh -.107 % -.564 % -.476 % -2.72 % 0 %
1: starting from incomplete-markets economy with σy(L)=.24 and σy(H)=.12.
2: starting from incomplete-markets economy with σy(L)=.28 and σy(H)=.08.
3: starting from complete-markets economy
a: elimination of variation in aggregate productivity and depreciation
b: elimination of variation in idiosyncratic risk and variation in aggregate productivity and
depreciation
33∆µg: change in aggregate consumption growth
∆c1: change in welfare (in terms of equivalent change in initial consumption)
∆c2: change in welfare for constant ∆µg (in terms of equivalent change in initial consump-
tion)
∆Xk/Y: change in the rate of saving in physical capital
∆Xh/Y: change in the rate of saving in human capital
∆rk: change in interest rate
∆rh: change in wage rate
34